2013 Decisions

Opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

2-5-2013

USA v. Michael Dotson

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013

Recommended Citation
"USA v. Michael Dotson" (2013). 2013 Decisions. 1251.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013/1251

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in 2013 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository.

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 11-4075
_____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
MICHAEL DANTIONE DOTSON,
Appellant
_____________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(D.C. Crim. No. 09-cr-00435-002)
District Judge: Honorable Cynthia M. Rufe
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 17, 2013
____________
Before: SMITH, CHAGARES and BARRY, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: February 05, 2013)
____________
OPINION
____________
BARRY, Circuit Judge
Michael Dantione Dotson appeals the judgment of the District Court sentencing
him to 240 months’ imprisonment for conspiracy to distribute and distribution of crack
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cocaine. His counsel filed a motion to withdraw and supporting brief pursuant to Anders
v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that there are no non-frivolous issues for
appeal. We will affirm the judgment of sentence and grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.
I.
Dotson participated in a crack cocaine trafficking organization that operated from
2004 until 2009 in the City of Lancaster and Columbia Borough, Pennsylvania. He
assisted Kevin Leon Major—the ringleader of the organization—by taking telephone
orders for crack cocaine, and filling those orders himself or having other members of the
organization fill the orders, and eventually became equal partners with Major. After
Major went to jail in February 2009, Dotson, along with several codefendants, assumed
control of the day-to-day operations of the organization. He was responsible for the
distribution of at least 1.5 kilograms of crack cocaine.
Dotson entered an open guilty plea on September 27, 2010 to one count of
conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base and one count of distributing
cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846(b), § 841(a)(1) and § 841(B)(1)(C). Prior to
the guilty plea, the government filed a prior felony information pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §
851 setting forth Dotson’s two prior convictions, both in the Lancaster County Court of
Common Pleas: (1) a 1998 conviction for conspiracy and possession of crack cocaine
with intent to deliver, for which Dotson received a sentence of time served to 23 months’
imprisonment; and (2) a 2001 conviction for possession of crack cocaine with intent to
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deliver, for which he received a sentence of 53 days to 23 months’ imprisonment. Dotson
spent considerably less than a year in prison on each of these prior convictions. Although
there was no plea agreement in this case, it was agreed that at the time of sentencing, the
government would withdraw one of the convictions from the information to reduce
Dotson’s sentencing exposure from a mandatory life sentence to a mandatory minimum
sentence of twenty years’ imprisonment.
At the sentencing hearing, Dotson did not object to the presentence report, did not
deny that he had been convicted twice in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
for dealing crack cocaine, and did not deny that the amount of crack cocaine involved in
the drug conspiracy before us triggered a statutory mandatory minimum ten-year sentence
pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii). Dotson, however, instructed his counsel to
argue that his prior drug convictions did not qualify as “felony drug offenses” under 21
U.S.C. §841(b)(1)(A), which would operate to enhance his mandatory minimum sentence,
because (1) the convictions were more than ten years old at the time of the sentencing
hearing, and (2) he served a term of less than a year on each of those convictions.
Following the government’s withdrawal of Dotson’s 1998 conviction from the prior
felony information, the District Court sentenced him to 240 months’ imprisonment. He
timely appealed.
II.
Under Anders v. California, if appellate counsel “finds his case to be wholly
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frivolous, after a conscientious examination of it, he should so advise the court and
request permission to withdraw. That request must, however, be accompanied by a brief
referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal.” 386 U.S. 738,
744 (1967). “The Court’s inquiry when counsel submits an Anders brief is thus twofold:
(1) whether counsel adequately fulfilled the rule’s requirements; and (2) whether an
independent review of the record presents any nonfrivolous issues.” United States v.
Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001). With respect to the first requirement:
The duties of counsel when preparing an Anders brief are (1) to satisfy the
court that counsel has thoroughly examined the record in search of
appealable issues, and (2) to explain why the issues are frivolous. Counsel
need not raise and reject every possible claim. However, at a minimum, he
or she must meet the “conscientious examination” standard . . . .
Id. (internal citations omitted). When reviewing the record for non-frivolous issues, we
generally confine our scrutiny to those portions of the record identified by an adequate
Anders brief, and the appellant’s pro se filings.
We conclude that counsel has satisfied his obligation to conduct a “conscientious
examination” of the case. Likewise, our independent analysis of the record reveals no
error in the guilty plea itself or in the sentence. With reference to the guilty plea, the
District Court ensured that it was knowing and voluntary, and thoroughly complied with
the requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 during the plea colloquy. As
for the sentence, Dotson did not dispute that he was subject to the ten-year mandatory
minimum on the conspiracy count to which he pled guilty. Moreover, he did not dispute
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that he had been convicted of distributing crack cocaine in 2001, an offense carrying a
maximum penalty of 10 years imprisonment. 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 780-113(f)(1.1).
The specific argument raised in Dotson’s pro se appellate brief is plainly without
merit. Dotson contends that because his 2001 drug conviction1 was more than ten years
old at the time of sentencing and resulted in his imprisonment for a term of less than one
year, it could not qualify as a “felony drug offense” that would operate to double his
mandatory minimum sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b). If, however, as here, a violation
of section 841(a) involves 280 grams or more of crack cocaine, and the person commits
the violation “after a prior felony drug offense has become final, such person shall be
sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may not be less than 20 years . . . .” 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(A).

21 U.S.C. § 802(44) defines a “felony drug offense” as “an offense that

is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year under any law of the United States
or of a State or foreign country that prohibits or restricts conduct relating to narcotic
drugs, marihuana, anabolic steroids, or depressant or stimulant substances.” The plain
language of the statute does not impose a time limitation on the prior felony or felonies
that would trigger an enhanced mandatory minimum. See United States v. Hudacek, 24
F.3d 143, 146 (11th Cir. 1994). Moreover, to qualify as a “felony drug offense,” it is not
necessary that the defendant actually serve, or even be sentenced to, a term of

1

Dotson states incorrectly that the government relied on his 1998 crack cocaine
conviction to establish a prior felony drug offense. The government dismissed this
conviction in its amended prior felony information, and relied instead on the 2001
5

imprisonment of more than one year. Rather, the predicate drug offense need only be
punishable by more than a year of imprisonment. Dotson was convicted in 2001 of
possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, which carries a maximum penalty of up to
ten years in prison. He was, therefore, subject to the sentence enhancement provision of
21 U.S.C. § 841(b).
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of sentence and grant
counsel’s motion to withdraw. We also find, pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 109.2(b),
that the issues presented in this appeal lack legal merit for the purposes of counsel filing a
petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States.

conviction. Because both offenses are more than ten years old and resulted in his
imprisonment for less than a year, Dotson’s argument is applicable to either conviction.
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